The attack on Riyadh exposes a shared regional interest: ending Iran's threats - and building a security partnership that asks less of America over time.

Shattered windows across several floors of the iconic Aramco skyscraper in Riyadh offered another reminder Sunday that the Iran conflict reaches far beyond Iran and Israel. 

And the U.S. midterm elections.

Saudi authorities said debris from intercepted projectiles damaged the building, with no casualties reported. Even successful air defenses could not keep the consequences entirely outside the kingdom’s financial district.

It was also a reminder that an Iron Dome isn’t really an iron dome.

For Saudi Arabia, the message was painfully familiar: economic modernization remains vulnerable to missiles launched by an Iranian-backed militia. For Israel, the same incident illustrated a threat it has confronted for years. Tehran’s regional network allows armed groups to endanger neighboring countries while complicating responsibility for individual attacks.

These countries have different histories, political systems, and priorities. The Gulf states are not interchangeable, nor are they all Israeli allies. Yet on the essential requirements for ending this conflict, their interests overlap remarkably.

They want an Iran that cannot acquire nuclear weapons, cannot repeatedly threaten its neighbors with missiles and drones, and stops supplying armed groups that attack across borders. They want commerce to proceed without shipping companies wondering whether the next passage through Hormuz or the Red Sea will end in fire.

This convergence is documented. The Gulf Cooperation Council has insisted that a settlement address Iran’s nuclear program, missiles, drones, and support for proxies. Israeli officials have identified preventing nuclear reconstruction, renewed missile production, and assistance to Iran’s regional armed partners as central objectives.

The disagreement concerns how to secure that outcome. Israeli leaders may consider additional military action necessary to prevent a more dangerous confrontation later. Saudi leaders must weigh the immediate exposure of their airports, oil installations, and cities. Their tolerance for escalation differs, even when their preferred destination is similar.

That creates an opportunity for American diplomacy. Washington should help turn overlapping interests into practical cooperation, with regional governments assuming greater responsibility for their own security.

Consider air defense. 

A more integrated network could share radar information, identify launches earlier, and coordinate interceptions across national boundaries. Israel could contribute technology and operational experience; Gulf countries could contribute geography, infrastructure, financing, and trained personnel. American intelligence and equipment would remain valuable, but regional forces could increasingly operate the system.

This is an extension of existing cooperation, rather than an imaginary alliance waiting to be invented. CENTCOM opened a regional air-defense coordination cell in Qatar in January to improve information sharing, planning, and responses. The long-term objective should be progressively greater regional ownership, supported by reliable American maintenance and supply arrangements.

A second scenario concerns maritime security. Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Bahrain, and other willing partners could provide more patrols, surveillance, and port support, alongside European and Asian countries whose trade depends on these waterways. Washington could supply specialized intelligence, coordination, and reinforcement during emergencies. Routine protection would become a shared responsibility requiring fewer persistent American deployments.

A third possibility combines diplomacy with economic incentives. Saudi Arabia and its Gulf partners could help offer Iran a credible path toward investment and trade, conditional on verified compliance. Israel would gain stronger protections against rebuilding prohibited capabilities. America would help negotiate and enforce the arrangement, while regional governments supplied more of its economic rewards and diplomatic engagement.

None of these arrangements would automatically settle Yemen or Lebanon. Their governments and communities need workable political agreements of their own. Iranian commitments must be matched by effective restrictions on weapons transfers and arrangements that local actors can sustain. Otherwise, a ceasefire simply creates time to rearm.

Washington’s commitment must also have boundaries. Helping defend allies should not mean automatically joining every offensive operation they initiate. Any American military mission should have a defined purpose, legal authority, review process, and conditions for ending it. Partners should understand those limits before a crisis begins.

Regional governments, in turn, must contribute personnel, funding, intelligence, and political compromises. Equipment purchases alone cannot substitute for cooperation. Nor can shared concern about Iran erase disagreements over the Palestinians, regional influence, or relations with Israel. Building trust will require sustained diplomacy, sometimes quietly, before formal agreements become possible.

Trump has an opening to pursue a lasting bargain: dependable American support in exchange for increasing regional responsibility. Success would mean fewer emergencies requiring direct U.S. intervention, with partners better prepared to handle threats themselves.

The damaged tower in Riyadh captures the stakes. Saudi Arabia wants to build its future. Israel wants its citizens to live beyond recurring threats of annihilation. Their neighbors want secure cities and dependable commerce. Those ambitions belong in the same regional settlement — and provide a practical foundation for achieving one.

(Contributing writer, Brooke Bell)